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Abstract 
 
The objective of this dissertation study is to examine whether German, United Kingdom 
and France markets show long-run performance of Initial Public Offering (IPO) or not, 
and what are the factors influence companies’  long-run performance after their listing. 
For this purpose buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) method is computed for 485 
firms that were listed during the period 2006-2009. The empirical results differ from 
international evidence for underperformance and reveal a strong positive performance 
that continues for a substantial interval after first listing. Later on, a multivariable 
regression is performed in order to check which factors influence firms’ abnormal 
returns. The BHARs are used as independent variables, while the dependent variables are 
the following: 1) the company size, 2) the issue size, 3) the leverage and finally 4) the time 
lag. The results show that only two variables influence the long-run returns which are the 
number of shares issued (issue size) and the current market capital (company size). 
However the other variables (leverage and time lag) do not influence the long-run 
performance in the three countries. Finally the above results are tested for their 
significance by simple t-statistic tests. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is an important milestone in the life cycle of a private 
organization, since through this procedure a private company will become a public one. 
The reasons why a company decides to go public are different such as diversification, 
liquidity, raising expansion capital etc. The founders have to allocate a portion of their 
ownership in order to exchange equity that they use to grow the business.  
     There have been numerous studies associated with the performance of companies 
going public for first time in many different markets. A large volume of researchers 
concluded in two phenomena related to IPOs; either the “Underpricing” or the “Long -
run underperformance”. In this study the second one is going to be performed. 
Underpricing is the phenomenon when the investors, participating in an IPO, earn high 
positive abnormal returns in the early aftermarket period. This happens because new 
shares are usually sold to investors at a price lower than those prevailing on the first day 
of trading. Long-run underperformance is the phenomenon when the performance of an 
IPO declines from year to year and finally turns negative. So comparing the performance 
of IPOs in short-term with the long-term performance, the results will show a better 
short-term performance rather than a long-term one.  
     The performances of IPOs have received an elaborate amount of attention in the last 
years. Ritter (1991) through his research showed that US IPOs significantly 
underperformed in the three years after listing. Similar results reported for IPOs in 
Germany by Bessler and Thies (2007), in UK by Levis (1993) and Espenlaub (2000), in 
Australia by Lee, Taylor and Water (1994) and in Spain by Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, 
Menendez and Sciereck (2005).  On the other hand there were also some studies that did 
not find evidence of long-run underperformance such as Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist 
(1994) for Sweden, Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1995) for Korea, Dawson (1987) for Malaysia 
and Kiymaz (1997) for Turkey.  
     The first objective of this paper is to evaluate the performance of firms listed in the 
stock exchange during the period of January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2009 in 
Germany, UK and France. The BHAR is defined as the raw return minus the 
corresponding market return (Thomadakis, 2007). In order to calculate raw returns, last 
stock prices in daily term for each company were excluded from Bloomberg  Database. 
Raw return is the individual return for each company while market return is the average 
return from all listed companies in a Stock Exchange Market or in a country generally. In 
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this study BHARs are computed using daily data for 125, 250, 375, 500, 625 and 750 days 
(6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months) as the difference between the compounded actual 
return of the company and the compounded return of the market. The results reveal a 
pretty high overperformance in the first two years and an evidence of a lower mean 
BHAR in the third year.    
     Another field, which has been intensively investigated by several economic 
researchers, concerns the possible reasons why some companies show underperformance 
in the long run IPO, while some others do not and also which are the possible factors 
that contribute to such a condition. This would be the second objective of this study. In 
order to examine the relationship between each factor and the long-run performance of 
companies’ IPOs, a multivariate regression will be performed. The factors including in 
the regression are the following: 1) the company size, 2) the issue size, 3) the leverage and 
finally 4) the time lag. The results show that only two variables influence the long-run 
performance of IPOs, the current market capital (company size) and the number of 
shares offered at the listing period (issue size).  
     The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some basic 
terminology and definitions in the IPOs literature; such as the reasons for going public, 
the procedure and the costs are required for a company to get listing. In section 3 most  
usual long-run evaluation models are quoted. Section 4 reviews the literature regarding 
the long-term performance of countries with different backgrounds and the potential 
factors that influence the after listing performance. Objectives of the study and data 
sources are presented in Section 5 while research methodology is given in Section 6. All 
the empirical findings are quoted and analyzed in section 7 and finally section 8 
summarizes the main results and concludes the paper by offering further 
recommendations for future research.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
2. Terminology and Definitions in the IPOs Literature 
2.1 What is an IPO, the procedure and the reasons for going Public 
 
An initial public offering (IPO) or stock market launch is a type of public offering where 
shares of stock in a company are sold to the general public for the first time. This activity 
becomes the most important moment for a company because through this process, a 
private company transforms into a public one. 
     An increasing number of companies, especially small and medium-sized firms, are 
choosing to create initial public offerings as a way to survive in today’s competitive and 
demanding marketplace. When an IPO is planned carefully and precisely executed could 
often provide an effective way to raise needed capital. Most common reasons why a 
company decides going public are the following; to access capital markets to raise money 
for the expansion of the operations, to provide liquidity for shareholders, to enhance the 
company’s reputation, to diversify and reduce investors’ holdings, to acquire other 
companies with publicly traded stock as the currency, to attract and retain talented 
employees etc. 
     Before deciding whether or not to go public, companies should evaluate all of the 
potential advantages and disadvantages that will arise. The primary and most important 
advantage a business stands to gain through an initial public stock offering is access to 
capital and therefore enlarging and diversifying its equity base. Additionally, the capital 
does not have to be repaid and simultaneously does not involve any kind of interest 
charges. The only reward that IPO investors are looking for is an appreciation of their 
investment and possibly future dividends. Building a broader equity base means that the 
company improves its debt-to-equity ratio; the company reduces its current cost of 
borrowing and make it easier to borrow additional funds as needed.  
     One additional financial gain is that when a company decides to make an initial public 
offering will also increase its public awareness and credibility.  This may lead to new 
opportunities and new costumers. Public companies are more carefully and closely 
monitored than private companies. So many investors feel that that they make for more 
stable and reliable investments. As part of the IPO process, information is printed in 
newspapers and inundates the media leading in an increase of firm’s publicity.  This 
increased demand is reflected in a higher overall valuation of the company. Moreover, 
once a public market for its shares has been established, the company is more able to 
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attract and retain quality employees. When a company is going public can offer another 
form of compensation such as stock options, stock purchase plans and stock 
appreciation rights. This kind of compensation not only conserves cash and offers tax 
advantages but also increases employees’ motivation and loyalty. (Richard P.Kleeburg, 
2005) 
     Going public is a significant milestone for a company. A successful Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) constitutes a dramatic change in the company and shareholder position 
with many new opportunities and numerous benefits, as well as a lot of new risks. Before 
the companies go public there are some requirements that have to be fulfilled by the 
company. First and foremost priority for the company is to develop an impressive 
management team, a steering committee which will take responsibility for higher-level 
strategic and structural decisions. Once the team of the company has been put together, 
the next step is to start gathering the financial information required to make sure 
everything is legitimate. This includes identifying, selling or writing off unprofitable 
assets, and finding areas where cash flow can be beefed up. Some months before the 
IPO is scheduled, the company has to draft the prospectus; the prospectus is the legal 
document used to promote the IPO and includes a three-year history of financial 
statements, facts and figures associated with the company as well as the initial selling 
price of a share of the company's stock. The prospectus is filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and labeled as a preliminary IPO which will be used to market to 
potential investors.1 The next step is to record the potential investors and both the 
number of shares they plan to buy and their ideal purchasing price. By this procedure the 
company could determine and decide which price per share would be the most attractive 
for the public. When the company fulfilled all the steps were mentioned above it means 
that they are ready to submit the final draft of the IPO to the SEC and begin selling their 
shares of stock to new investors. 
2.2 Costs of going Public 
 
The costs of going public are of interest in the finance literature. When firms decide to 
go public, they incur costs associated with the initial public offering (IPO) process.  
According to the financial economic literature, costs are split-up into two categories, the 
direct costs which are fairly predictable and indirect costs, commonly known as IPO 
                                                          
1  http://www.ehow.com 
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underpricing. As direct costs considered all those expenses which are related to the listing 
decision. For example, underwriting fees paid to the lead investment communities; 
banks, lawyers, auditors. In addition direct costs are fees paid to the Stock Exchange, 
advertising or press costs. While indirect costs are considered those that have an impact 
on the equity valuation. The major expenses associated with an IPO are summarized in 
the remainder of this section. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Direct and Indirect Costs associated with the listing decision 
 
 
 
Underwriting fees: When a company is going to make a public offering, its first step is to 
select an investment bank to advise it and to perform underwriting functions in 
connection with the issue.2 Among the direct costs, the underwriting fees paid to 
investment banks typically represent the largest cost item of an IPO. The underwriters’ 
commission is expressed in a percentage term ranging from six to nine percent of the 
public offering of new common stock issue. 
 
                                                          
2 Katrina Ellis(1999), A Guide to the Initial Public Offering Process 
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Professional fees: Companies going public often engage professional advisors that can 
navigate the way through the complex and time consuming process. Professional fees 
include any kind of payable professional advice; legal, accounting and audit fees.  These 
kinds of fees vary with the circumstances and depend on the company’s size, scope and 
the complexity of the operations.  
 
Advertising and other costs related to IPOs: These costs cover printing of the registration 
statement, the prospectus, the stock certificates and the underwriting documents. 
Moreover cover all the publishing and advertising procedure. 
 
Underpricing: The indirect cost of an Initial Public Offering, commonly known as IPO 
underpricing, is one of the most perplexing puzzles in finance. It is observed in almost 
every financial market in the world and across all procedures of share allocation. Many 
empirical studies have documented a strong trend of issuing companies to systematically 
offer their shares at a significant discount. According to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), 
this IPO discount is measured as the difference between the offer price and the closing 
market price of the first trading day.3 Although most IPOs are underpriced, the level 
varies among IPOs with different characteristics, allocation mechanisms, underwriter 
reputation and financial market conditions.4 
3.  Long-run performance Evaluation  
 
The success of an Initial Public Offering is best evaluated by how well the firm performs 
in the long run period. Long-run performance of IPO is a performance that is being 
analyzed in the long-run periods of time, two until three years or more after the listing 
date. When we are talking about long-run underperformance we mean a situation of 
long-run performance of IPO, which shows a decline from year to year.5 In recent years, 
academic researchers focused their attention on the long-run performance of newly listed 
firms. The evidence which has emerged from several studies is that during the first few 
                                                          
3 Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003),IPO pricing in the Dot-com Bouble, Journal of Finance 58 
4 http://www.qfinance.com , Lena Booth, The Cost of Going Public: Why IPOs Are Typically        
Underpriced 
5 Mahardhini Fuadillah, Agus Harjito (2009), Long-run IPO performances and it’s influencing 
factors: the case of Indonesian Stock Exchange 
10 
 
years of their public listing IPOs significantly and economically underperforms 
comparable benchmarks (Loughran, 1994). 
     The phenomenon of long-run underperformance of newly listed firms is of great 
interest because has several implications on all those factors associated with an IPO; 
beginning with the firms which decide to go public. If IPOs underperform in the long-
run, issuers raise less capital and they suffer an opportunity cost of low returns on shares 
they retain. A poor performance in the long run will affect negatively the primary market 
investors too, who will be discouraged from holding shares beyond the first days of 
trading. In the same way, if new offerings systematically underperform in the long run, 
secondary market investors who were not able to buy shares at subscription will seek 
alternative investments and they would not be interest anymore in the case of an IPO. As 
concerns the underwriters, if they price an IPO above its true market value, subscribers 
would possibly reject such an offering because they would receive inferior returns. On 
the other hand, if underwriters price IPOs below their true market values deprive issuers 
the opportunity to raise external equity capital, leading them to find another way of 
investing their money. 
     There is a considerable variation in the measures of abnormal returns and the 
statistical tests that empirical researchers use to detect long-run abnormal returns. Ritter 
(1991) for example suggests that the selection of a benchmark portfolio, the length of the 
period over which the performance is measured as well as the sample selection criteria 
explain the differences in observed performances and it might be a good tool to avoid 
misleading results. Ritter supports that the simplest and more intuitive measure for 
abnormal returns is the buy-and-hold adjusted returns (BHAR).  
The above method is recommended by Barber and Lyon too. Barber and Lyon (1997) in 
their study on long-run abnormal returns claim that many of the common methods used 
to calculate the long-run returns are conceptually flawed or lead to biased test statistics. 
Moreover, they support that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as a measurement 
technique is a biased predictor of long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns. So they 
concluded in using the BHAR method to examine abnormal returns. Additional, they 
propose that the distribution of the BHAR is positively skewed and does not have a zero 
mean.  
     Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that the BHAR is the most appropriate estimator 
because of its tendency to be more sensitive to the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence among sample firms. Moreover, Barber and Lyon (1997) support that the 
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BHAR “is measuring the investor experience” and that is more appropriate for 
researchers who are studying whether the offerings listed in the stock market earned 
abnormal returns or not. In addition, Kothari and Warner (1997) through their study 
concluded that the common estimation procedures can produce biased BHAR estimates 
and those biases arise from new listings, rebalancing of benchmark portfolios and 
skewness of multiyear abnormal returns. 
     On the other hand, Fama (1998) argues that the BHAR methodology is biased 
because the systematic errors that arise with imperfect expected returns proxies are 
compounded with long-horizon returns. In addition Fama supports that “any estimation 
method that ignores cross-sectional dependence of event firm abnormal returns that are 
overlapping in calendar-time is likely to produce overstated test statistics”. Therefore, the 
methodology for measuring long-term abnormal returns Fama strongly recommends is a 
monthly calendar-time portfolio. The key advantage of this method is that forms 
portfolios in calendar time and not in event time, which means that biases included by 
potential clustering are minimized. However this method has many opponents; Kothari 
and Warner (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) argue that the calendar-time 
portfolio approach is severely misspecified for nonrandom samples.  
     According to all mentioned above and for the purposes of the study, the method of 
buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) will be used to evaluate the long-run performance of the 
three European countries’ IPOs. This methodology involves the calculation of the three 
years buy-and-hold returns which are calculated by using the raw returns and the excess 
or adjusted returns. Also regarding the period time, will be from the first trading day after 
the companies are listing until the three year anniversary of their listings. 
 
4. Review of Literature 
4.1 Some previous studies 
 
In the finance literature there exist numerous studies which investigate the aftermarket 
performance of IPOs. Prior research studies concentrate mainly on the phenomenon of 
long-run performance of IPOs. Ritter (1991) was the first financial economist who 
produced academic evidence documenting poor abnormal returns that follow an IPO. 
Ritter analyzes the performance of 1526 IPOs issued between 1975 and 1984 in US and 
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calculates returns based on cumulative average adjusted returns (CAR) as well as three 
year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). He concluded that firms underperformed 
the market benchmark by about 29% in the three year period after their launch and that 
IPOs make bad medium- to long-term investments. Ritter explained that there are some 
possible explanations for the underperformance condition; they are risk miss-
measurement, bad luck, fad and over-optimism. 
     Subsequent research using larger and longer sample periods confirmed the initial 
results of Ritter. Loughram and Ritter (1995) expanded upon the initial Ritter’s study, 
using a sample of 4.753 operating companies’ IPOs between 1970 and 1990. They used a 
variety of procedures and benchmarks and concluded that the average underperformance 
in the US market is 7% to 8% per year for five years.  
     Drobetz, Kammerman and Walchli (2005) estimated the long-run performance of 109 
Swiss IPOS from 1983 to 2000 by BHAR, skewness-adjusted wealth ratios and 
cumulative abnormal returns using 120 months of secondary market returns. They use a 
much longer sample period than is usually applied in the literature and they conclude that 
the underperformance after three years was only about 7.5%.   
     The long-run performance of UK IPOs for the period of 1991 until 1995 was 
analyzed by Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007). They examined the performance 
of 252 IPOs that were listed on the London Stock Exchange using various 
methodologies such as BHAR, CAR and Fama and French three-factor returns. The 
CAR that they observed over the first 36 months was -21.3%. Goergen, Khurshed and 
Mudambi concluded in two main findings. Firstly, the percentage of equity issued and 
the degree of multinationality of a firm are the key predictors of its performance after an 
IPO. And secondly, small firms behave differently from large firms and suffer from 
worse long-run performance than large firms.6 
     Additionally, a study performed by Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, Menendez and Schiereck 
(2005) examines the long-run stock market performance of German and Spanish IPOs. 
Their sample consists of 153 firms between 1990 and 2001 and they use BHAR in order 
to determine abnormal returns. They conclude that the underperformance after three 
years was 32.8% for German and 36.7% for Spanish IPOs. Furthermore, Jaskiewicz, 
                                                          
6 Goergen, M., Khurshed, A. & Mudambi R., 2007.The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial 
Public predict. 
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Gonzalez, Menendez and Schiereck through a regression obtain that in family-owned 
businesses, strong family involvement has a positive impact on the long-run stock market 
performance, whereas the age of the firm has a negative influence. 7 
     It is interested to note that a similar study performed by Bessler and Thies (2007) 
using a sample of 218 firms over the period 1977 to 1995. Using a BHAR period of three 
years they calculated the returns as 12.7%. Bessler and Thies support that the poor long-
run performance of IPOs only happened in some companies, while the other companies 
show positive long-run. So, every company will not show the same long-run 
underperformance condition. 
     Based on this assumption, many researchers are interested in explaining the reasons 
why some companies show underperformance in the long run IPO, while the others do 
not. Dimovski and Brooks (2004) examined the role of financial and non-financial 
characteristics of IPOs. They concluded that there are relationships between IPO and 
pre-IPO financial performance. (Offer price, capital sought, hare options, underwritten, 
market sentiment, capital retained and limited liability etc.). They found that only market 
sentiment and the underwriter options have positive coefficient, while share option and 
DPS yield have negative coefficient relationship.8 
     Gounopoulos, Merikas, Karli , Nounis (2009) analyze the initial and aftermarket  
returns for US- listed shipping IPOs. Their main objective of their research is to test 
the extent to which signaling models explain the reasons for the issuance of IPOs using 
the long-term price performance approach. Their sample consists of 61 IPOs listed 
during the period 1987–2007 in four major US Stock Exchanges and they use 
a variety of methods for measuring long-term abnormal returns; BHAR, CAR, FF3F 
models. In order to check for an explanation of cross-sectional differences of the long-
run performance of the US-listed Shipping IPOs they implement a multivariate 
regression using a number of potential factors such as the size and the age of the firm 
before going public, the underwriter’s reputation, the proportion of given ownership by  
the initial shareholders, the reputation of the stock exchange and the country where IPOs 
have their headquarters. 
                                                          
7 Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, Menendez and Schiereck, (2005). Long-Run IPO Performance Analysis 
of German and Spanish Family-Owned Businesses 
8 Mahardhini Fuadillah, Agus Harjito (2009), Long-run IPO performances and it’s influencing 
factors: the case of Indonesian Stock Exchange 
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     A unique academic research was conducted by Alvarez and Gonzalez (2001), 
analyzing the Spanish IPOs of 56 firms during the period 1987-1997. In their study they 
have used different methods in order to examine the robustness of the long-run 
performance of the IPOs regarding various specifications of the model; buy-and-hold 
returns (BHR), calendar-time portfolios and the Fama and French three-factor model. 
They believed that the result of long-run IPO performance examination depends on the 
methodology is used. Thus, there exists long-run underperformance when buy-and-hold 
returns are used and not when mean calendar-time returns are employed. 
     This result was mentioned above is in line with the evidence presented by Brav and 
Gompers (1997) in reference to the fact that the use of BHRs tends to magnify the long-
run underperformance of IPOs. They investigate the long-run underperformance of 
recent firms IPOs in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972-1992 and 3.407 
nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975-1992. They believe that the results of BHAR are 
different from the Fama-French’s model in explaining the long-run performance, and on 
the other hand BHAR gives different result comparing with the method of Average 
Monthly Market Adjusted Return (MMAR).  
     As concerns the performance of IPOs in the aftermarket, although most studies show 
that IPOs significantly underperform in the first few years of their public listing, on the 
other hand some academic researchers find that new issues generate positive abnormal 
returns in the long-run such as McDonald and Jacquillat (1974), Dawson (1987) and 
Kiymaz (1997). McDonald and Jacquillat for example fulfilled their study using 31 IPOs 
in France for the time period 1968-1971 and concluded in a percentage of 15.60% 
positive abnormal returns. Moreover Dawson (1987) who examined 21 IPOs in Malaysia 
during the period of 1978 to 1993 and Kiymaz (1997) who evaluated 138 IPOs from 
1990 until 1995 in Turkey, they concluded that the performance after 3 years were 
18.20% and 44.10% respectively. 
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Table 1: Summary of IPO long-run performance 
Country Authors N Period AIR 
US Ritter (1991) 1526 1975-1984 -29% 
US Loughram and Ritter (1995) 4753 1970-1990 -8% 
Switzerland Drobetz, et al. (2005) 109 1983-2000 -7,50% 
UK Goergen, et al. (2007) 252 1991-1995 -21,30% 
Germany Jaskiewicz, et al. (2005)  153 1990-2001 -32,80% 
Spanish Jaskiewicz, et al. (2005)  153 1990-2001 -36,70% 
Germany Bessler and Thies (2007) 218 1977-1995 -12,70% 
France McDonald and Jacquillat (1974) 31 1968-1971 15,60% 
Malaysia Dawson (1987) 21 1978-1993 18,20% 
Turkey Kiymaz (1997) 138 1990-1995 44,10% 
Notes: a) N signifies the number of observations included in each respective study and b) AIR denotes 
the average initial returns. 
 
4.2 Influencing Factors according to the Literature 
 
Company Size: In this study as company size is taken the total current market value of all 
the company’s outstanding shares stated in the pricing currency. Capitalization is a 
measure of corporate size. Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav (2000) showed that 
smaller companies have a worse stock market performance than bigger one. Drobetz, 
Kammermann and Walchli (2005) through their research concluded that Swiss IPOs 
have poor long-run performance and showed that those firms tend to be small. 
Gounopoulos (2005) claimed that smaller firms tend to be more risky and in addition 
Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, Memendez and Schiereck (2005) showed that the German and 
Spanish family owned businesses that are small have more negative long-run 
performance than bigger one.  
 
Issue Size: Issue size is defined as the current number of shares outstanding and the offer 
price issued (Counopoulos, 2005).9 The size of the offer has been shown to have an 
effect on the long-run performance of IPOs. According to Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) 
the larger the offer characterized by the IPO the less the risky the offer as it is indicative 
                                                          
9 Mahardhini Fuadillah, Agus Harjito (2009), Long-run IPO performances and it’s influencing 
factors: the case of Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
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of a more established firm.10 In many studies the size of the issue was an important 
factor to control the issuer’s overall risk and issue uncertainty. For example if there is a 
particularly large new issue that is going to trade in a Stock Exchange, it is very often that 
the stock will “get a lot of attention” either from the media or financial analysts. So on 
the one hand a high offering size could create confidence while on the other hand if the 
offering size is low it could create uncertainty.  
 
Time Lag: According to Gounopoulos (2006) time lag is defined as the period between 
the official date of the prospectus announcement (or offer price date) and the first day 
the company is listed public. This variable has been well researched by literature and the 
general idea is that time lag has a negative implication either for underwriter or the 
investor. The latter has to wait to get informed about the actual market value of his 
purchase security, so this situation creates uncertainty. While in the case of the 
underwriter, this waiting time creates costs. Furthermore any possible change of the 
Economy could affect negatively the price performance (Thomadakis, 2007).  
 
Leverage: Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Leverage Ratio is used to see the effect of firms’ debt level on its profits and its IPO’s 
performance. It is an important subject in corporate finance and theory assumes that a 
high leverage show a high level of risk. On the other hand, leverage may also increase the 
return on equity. More specifically, it is expected that as the firms’ debt level increases 
IPO performance of the firm should also increase. Chen (2001) and Eckbo and Norli 
(2005) showed that leverage factor is influential in IPO long-run performance. They 
claim that high-leveraged IPOs are riskier and this riskiness declines over time after 
issuance. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Prabeshan Govindasamy(2010), The long run performance of initial public offerings in South 
Africa. 
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5. Objectives of the study and data sources 
 
This study has been aimed at appraising the price performance of European IPOS 
(German, UK, and France) and to judge the extent of potential underperformance. This 
chapter covers the objectives of the study, data sources and methodology performed in 
the study. 
 
5.1 Sample of data 
 
The aim of this study is to determine the long run performance of IPOs in the three 
biggest markets of Europe. The research design adopted is thus a quantitative one due to 
the data analysis required. In order to determine the long-run performance of IPOs, 
information on share price history and that of a benchmark is required.  
     The sample consists of 485 firms listed and subsequently traded on Exchange Market 
during the period of January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2009. Information on new issues 
was obtained from Thomson One database. According to the information of Thomson 
database, during that period 745 IPOs have taken place in three European countries; 151 
in Germany, 221 in France and 373 in United Kingdom. From this sample of 745 IPOs I 
excluded 260 firms due to insufficient data or other firm-specific reasons. Since I have 
searched the appropriate ticker for every company of my sample, I downloaded daily 
stock prices from Bloomberg database. Moreover, a broad market index for each country 
was used as the benchmark to adjust the data and provide the abnormal returns required 
(CAC Index for France, DAX Index for Germany and UKX Index for United 
Kingdom). I calculated benchmark-adjusted returns as the raw return on a stock minus 
the benchmark return over the first day of trading. This is the general procedure used to 
estimate IPOs performance and adopted by most researchers as was mentioned above. 
The companies included in the sample have different years of listed, thus the data have 
been collected based on the year of each company. Summarizing we observe that the 
sample selection is based on three particular criteria; first of all this study is conducted to 
private and public companies listed in Germany, in UK and in France, secondly the 
samples are the companies doing IPO during the period from 2006 until 2009 and finally 
the sample will be observed for 3 years after the listing date. Table 2 provides the yearly 
frequency of IPOs, while Table 3 provides the number of IPOs in different industries. 
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Table 2:  Yearly Frequency of IPOs 
Year France Germany UK Total 
2009 21 3 8 32 
2008 19 4 13 36 
2007 61 45 95 201 
2006 56 40 120 216 
Total 157 92 236 485 
 
     The highest number of IPOs is observed in year 2006 with 216 IPOs, followed by 
201 IPOs in year 2007. In the next two years 2008 and 2009 the percentage of IPOs is 
reduced rapidly; 36 new listings for year 2008 and 32 IPOs for year 2009. A possible 
explanation of that situation could be the global financial crisis that started to show its 
effects in the middle of 2007 and into 2008. 
Table 3: Industry Classification 
Industries Number of IPOs   % of Total 
Consumer Products and Services 51 10,52% 
Consumer Staples 16 3,30% 
Energy and Power 35 7,22% 
Financials 81 16,70% 
Healthcare 33 6,80% 
High Technology 79 16,29% 
Industrials 57 11,75% 
Materials 35 7,22% 
Media and Entertainment 26 5,36% 
Real Estate 37 7,63% 
Retail 18 3,71% 
Telecommunications 17 3,51% 
Total of Industries 12 485 100,00% 
 
     The firms of the sample belong to twelve different sectors. As we can see from the 
table above, the majority of the sample (approximately 55% of total sample- 268 IPOs) is 
observed in four industries, Consumer Products and Services, Financials, High 
Technology and Industrials. 
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5.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
 
The primary aim of this research is to investigate the long-run performance of IPOs in 
Germany, UK and France. Following from the literature, an assessment of this 
performance over a three year period will be employed as this was shown from previous 
studies as a standard evaluation period. This study uses two groups of indicators, those 
that represent the long-run performance of IPOs and those that influence the 
relationship between long-run performance and some factors.  
     All the hypotheses are implemented in the following study are based on previous 
findings. According to an important number of researchers who have conducted 
research in different markets in the world, firms’ IPOs finally underperform the market 
showing a decline from year to year after the listing day. According to those researches, 
this study assumes that the three countries will also have a long-run underperformance. 
Thus this study formulates the hypothesis as follows: 
 
 H1: Germany’s, United Kingdom’s and France’s IPOs show long-run underperformance. 
 
     In previous chapter the four potential factors that influence the long-run performance 
of an IPO were quoted and analyzed; First of all the company size. According to the 
most researchers smaller firms tend to be more risky. So, we assess that the company size 
affect the long-run performance positive. The hypothesis is formed as follows: 
 
H2: The company size will influence the long-run positively. 
 
     The next factor is studied in the multiple regression is the Issue Size (Size of the 
stock). It is said that the larger the number of stocks offered the lower the 
underperformance of long-run IPOs. This happens because more issue size means lower 
uncertainty of ex post value (Thomadakis, 2007). The third hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
H3: The Issue Size will influence the long-run performance positively. 
 
     The next factor is Time Lag, the period between the offer price date and the listing 
date of an IPO. As was mentioned previously, the longer the time period is, the more the 
uncertainty either for investor or the underwriter. Thus the Time Lag will influence the 
long-run performance negatively. The related hypothesis is formulated below:  
 
H4: The longer the waiting period of a firm to get listed the lower the long-run performance. 
 
     Last but not least influencing factor is the Leverage. It is expected that as the firms’ 
leverage increases, IPO performance of the firm should also increase. So looking at that 
assumption the fifth hypothesis of the study is formulated as follows:  
 
H5: Leverage will influence the long run performance positively.  
 
5.3 Objectives of the study 
 
More specifically, the study has been designed to achieve the following two objectives:  
 To study the long-run performance of IPOs in Germany United Kingdom and 
France; if the IPOs show long-run underperformance or not. 
 To investigate in depth and assess what factors influence IPO long-run 
performance and to what extent. 
 
6. Research Methodology  
The most commonly used methodology for long-term analysis is the Buy-and-Hold 
Adjusted Returns (BHAR). Arrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992), Rau and Vermalen 
(1998), Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) have showed that the long-run effect 
analysis is necessary because the valuation effects of restructuring may occur also in the 
long-term horizon and not only at time of the announcement. According to Ritter (1991) 
BHAR is the simplest and most intuitive measure for raw returns.  
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     In this paper the method is used for this purpose is the Buy-and-Hold Adjusted 
Returns estimator. The BHAR is defined as the raw return minus the corresponding 
market return (Thomadakis, 2007). For the calculation of raw returns I downloaded from 
Bloomberg Database the last stock prices in daily term for each company. Raw return is 
the individual return for each company while market return is the average return from all 
listed companies in a Stock Exchange Market or in a country generally. In this study 
BHARs are computed using daily data for 125, 250, 375, 500, 625 and 750 days (6, 12, 
18, 24, 30 and 36 months) as the difference between the compounded actual return of 
the company and the compounded return of the market. The formula is used for the 
calculation of BHAR is the following one: 
 
 
where, 
 is the time t log-return on security i 
is the time t log-return on the market index  
 
     The advantage of using this method is that the terminal values of investing in both 
the IPO and the benchmark are compared (Bessler and Thies, 2007). From the formula 
of BHAR we can easily understand that if a company’s raw returns are more than 
market’s returns (positive BHAR), the performance of that company is better than the 
average performance of company listed in stock exchange market or in a country more 
generally. In the averse case, when the returns of a company are lower than the market’s 
returns (negative BHAR), the performance of the company is worse. 
     Also in the long-term horizon analysis BHAR is tested for the statistical significance. 
Firstly, the t-statistics for the different normal return estimation procedures are 
computed. Due to the fact that market returns are used as reference portfolio in order to 
estimate normal returns, the distribution of abnormal returns in the long-runs is 
positively skewed. This results in misspecified t-statistics, for which reasons the 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic11 is calculated as shown by the following equation: 
 
                                                          
11 Pastor-Llorca and Martin-Ugedo, (2004) 
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=  (S+   +  ) 
Where,  
N   is the number of events in the sample 
 
S    S=  
 
   is the coefficient of skewness 
 
 
Estimated       
 
ABHARt and σ(BHAR)t are the sample mean and cross-sectional standard deviation of 
buy-and-hold returns for the sample of N events. 
      
The next part of this study involves the implementation of a multiple regression in order 
to examine the relationship between each factor and the long-run performance of 
companies’ IPOs. Previous studies have identified a number of determinants for the 
long-term underperformance of the IPOs, however for the purposes of this study, four 
of them were chosen and their overall significance will be investigated. The specification 
adopted is the following: 
 
BHARi= c + β1 (CS)i + β2(IS)i + β3(TLAG)i + β4(LEV)i + εi 
 
     Where, εi is the error term or disturbance, CS is the company size, IS is the issue size, 
TLAG is a period which called time lag and LEV is the leverage ratio. All these factors 
are analyzes below. 
     From the model above, we can see that Company Size, Issue Size, Time Lag and 
Leverage will influence BHAR as β1, β2, β3, β4 respectively. This means that if there is a 
change in Company size for example as one then the BHAR will change as  β1, while if 
there is a change of Company size as two, the BHAR will change as 2(β1) and so on. 
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7. Empirical Results 
7.1 Preliminary analysis 
 
The long-run performance for the IPOs in the sample was calculated using BHAR 
method. The sample period used was for IPOs listed between 2006 and 2009. As 
concerns the location, the sample of this study covers the three biggest European 
markets: German, UK and France Market. Only those listings that provided at least for 
one semi-annual period share prices data was included in the sample. The BHAR was 
calculated either for the three countries together or for each one separately in a 
semiannual term.  
     As it was mentioned previously the advantage of using this method is that the 
terminal values of investing in both the IPO and the benchmark are compared. In this 
study BHARs are computed using daily data for 125, 250, 375, 500, 625 and 750 days (6, 
12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months) as the difference between the compounded actual return  
of the company and the compounded return of the market. For the calculation of BHAR 
I follow the procedure most studies do; I exclude the first day returns, since the price at 
the end of the first trading day is a better proxy for firm value than the IPO price. Also a 
simple cross-sectional t-test is calculated to test the null hypothesis that the expected 
BHAR for each event firm is zero. If the value of t-statistic is greater than 2, then we 
conclude that the result is statistically significant, meaning that BHAR is different from 
zero (alternative hypothesis).  
     The table below represents the average BHAR for each period of time (6-month 
period) for the three countries in combination. In the fourth column the value of t-
statistic is quoted in order to evaluate the significance of our results.  
 
Table 4: Average BHAR and test of significance 
Period of time Mean BHAR Percentage t-statistic 
6-month 0,0886 8,86% 4,9384 
12-month 0,1252 12,52% 5,0638 
18-month 0,2054 20,54% 8,4428 
24-month 0,2536 25,36% 11,4023 
30-month 0,2776 27,76% 10,6197 
36-month 0,2589 25,89% 10,3423 
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As we can see from the table above, BHARs overperform substantially the market in 
every single period, with BHAR reaches its highest positive figure in the fifth semester 
(27.76%). At the end of the second year mean-adjusted returns were doubled comparing 
to the first year, while at the end of the third year a low decline is observed. These results 
reveal that new issues in German, UK and France stock markets offer investors 
substantial long-term adjusted returns for at least three years after listing. This positive 
performance distinguishes the European market from other cases where the positive 
returns wane at the end of the first months or better within one year after listing. In 
addition all the BHARs are significant since their t-statistic is pretty higher that the critical 
value of 2, meaning that we reject the null hypothesis that the expected BHAR for each 
company is equal to zero. 
     In the same conclusion we are leading if we examine the BHAR for each country 
individually. As concerns the Germany, all BHARs overperform the market in a high 
percentage for each semester. The results are presented below. The mean adjusted returns 
are beginning with an overperformance of 14.46% in the first 6 months, increase in the 
next semesters and finally touch a significant high value of 41.42% in the fifth semester. 
While, the results of the last period reveal a potential reduction of mean BHAR. In other 
words we find evidence that investors, who participated in German market during the 
period 2006-2009, obtained strong long-term positive returns until the third year after 
their listing. According to the t-statistics values we reject the null hypothesis that the 
expected BHAR for each company is equal to zero. 
 
Table 5: Average BHAR and test of significance for Germany  
Period of time Mean BHAR Percentage t-statistic 
6-month 0,1446 14,46% 8,2530 
12-month 0,1570 15,70% 4,9163 
18-month 0,2983 29,83% 8,7395 
24-month 0,2798 27,98% 9,4334 
30-month 0,4287 42,87% 11,2687 
36-month 0,4142 41,42% 17,0533 
 
     Evaluating the results of UK and France, we conclude that both produce positive 
returns for every semester. Despite the fact that every single period the performance 
percentage is increasing for the two countries, Germany “remains at the top”. UK 
reaches its highest positive figure in the fourth semester with an overperformance of 
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28.34%, while France in the whole second year with a value of 17.10% for the first 
semester and 17.49% for the second one. T-statistic values indicate significance for both 
countries, leading to the rejection of null hypothesis for zero mean BHAR.  
 
 
Table 6: Average BHAR and test of significance for United Kingdom 
Period of time Mean BHAR Percentage t-statistic 
6-month 0,0568 5,68% 2,4957 
12-month 0,1097 10,97% 4,5684 
18-month 0,1859 18,59% 8,346 
24-month 0,2834 28,34% 13,8389 
30-month 0,2677 26,77% 11,8126 
36-month 0,2661 26,61% 10,0634 
 
 
Table 7: Average BHAR and test of significance for France 
Period of time Mean BHAR Percentage t-statistic 
6-month 0,0934 9,34% 4,8177 
12-month 0,1312 13,00% 6,7458 
18-month 0,1713 17,10% 9,6878 
24-month 0,1749 17,49% 10,0187 
30-month 0,1639 16,39% 9,9376 
36-month 0,1032 10,32% 5,2246 
 
 
7.2Regression Results 
 
This research analyzes the performance of IPOs in Germany, UK and France. Thus this 
study will try to examine the condition of each company for three years in a semiannual 
term. For this purpose a multivariable regression is performed in order to check which 
factors influence firms’ abnormal returns. The BHARs are used as independent variables, 
while the dependent variables are the following: 1) company size, 2) issue size, 3) leverage 
and finally 4) time lag. 
      I choose one multiple regression including the four explanatory factors instead of 
four separate regressions because I believe that is of greater interest and the result would 
26 
 
be more valid having more than one variables in the regression at the same time. The 
general equation with k regressors (independent variables) is as follows: 
 
yt = β1 + β2χ2t + β3χ3t +….+ βk χkt + ut,   t=1,2,….,T 
 
     Where the variables χ2t, χ3t, …, χkt  are a set of explanatory variables which are thought to 
influence y and the coefficient estimates β1, β2, …. , βk are the parameters that quantify the 
effect of these variables on y. This means that every coefficient measures the average 
change in the explained variable (dependent) per unit change in a given explanatory 
variable (independent), holding all other explanatory variables constant at their average 
values.12 So adjusting the above regression model to the cross-sectional data of this study 
we conclude in the following regression: 
 
BHAR i= c + β1 (CS) i + β2 (IS) i + β3 (TLAG) i + β4 (LEV) i + εi 
 
     Where BHAR i are the buy-and-hold adjusted returns, c is the constant term, CS is the 
company size, IS is the issue size, TLAG is the period between the announcement date 
and the listing date, LEV is the leverage ratio of each listing company, β1, β2, β3, β4 are 
parameters to be estimated and finally, εi is the error term or disturbance assuming the 
usual properties. Parameter estimates for the above equation, by means of the Ordinary 
Least Squares estimation technique (OLS), along with their associated standard errors, t-
statistics and p-values are analytically illustrated in Tables below. Six different regressions 
are prepared in order to examine the relationship between the returns and the influencing 
factors in each period of time.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Chris Brooks (2008), Introductory Econometrics for Finance, second edition, Cambridge, pg 
88-89 
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Table 8: Estimation output for first 6-month period 
Variable  Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic p-value 
      
Constant  -0.163893 0.160130 -1.023502 0.3100 
Issue Size  0.173515 0.040285 4.307145 0.0001 
Leverage  0.009364 0.013307 0.703693 0.4843 
Company Size  -0.074202 0.022981 -3.228882 0.0020 
Time Lag  -0.009914 0.017756 -0.558378 0.5786 
 
Regression Diagnostic Statistics 
 
R-squared 0.263404  Mean dependent var 0.132558 
Adjusted R-squared 0.215881  S.D. dependent var 0.356652 
S.E. of regression 0.315817  Akaike info Criterion 0.604391 
Sum squared resid 6.183923  Schwarz criterion 0.768920 
Log likelihood -15.24710  Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.669496 
F-statistic 5.542732  Durbin-Watson stat. 1.839438 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000702   
 
 
      According to econometric literature most of the independent variables should be 
individually significant. The significance for a coefficient can be affirmed by the 
corresponding t-statistic or alternatively by the associated p-value. The t-statistic is 
calculated by dividing the estimated coefficient by the associated standard error. So we 
know whether each and every independent variable (Issue Size, Leverage, Company Size, 
Time Lag) is individually significant or not to influence the dependent variable (BHAR). 
If the p-value of t-statistic is less than 0.05 (selected level of significance) then we reject 
the null hypothesis (β1=0, β2=0, β3=0, β4=0) and accept the alternative hypothesis (β1≠0, 
β2≠0, β3≠0, β4≠0). In our case, only two variables appear to be significant, the Issue Size 
with a p-value of 0.0001 and the Company Size with a p-value of 0.0020. This means that 
these particular independent variables are considered significant to influence the BHAR.  
As concerns the first coefficient we could say that on each one percent increase of 
BHAR, there would be an impact on 0.173515 percent of total share, provided that all 
the other variables remain constant. While for the second coefficient we could say that 
on each one percent increase of BHAR, there would be an impact on 0.074202 percent 
decrease of current market capital percentage, with the assumption that all the other 
variables remain constant.  
     The next parameter we are examining is the “Goodness of Data Fit”, meaning how 
well the regression model actually fits the data. The most common goodness statistic is 
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known as R2 and is defined as follows: “the square of the correlation between the values 
of the dependent variable and the corresponding fitted values from the model”13. A 
correlation coefficient must lie between -1 and +1. A value close to 1 indicates that the 
model explains nearly all of the variability of the dependent variable about its mean value, 
while on the other hand a value close to 0 indicates that the model fits the data poorly. 
As we can see from the table above the R2 value is 0.263404. This means that 26.34% 
variation in BHAR (depended variable) can be explained jointly by the four independent 
variables. The rest 73.66% variation in BHAR can be expressed by residuals or other 
variables (other than Issue Size, Leverage, Company Size and Time Lag).  
     In addition, for testing the joint significance of all the independent variables included 
in the model the value of F-statistic is evaluated. If the p-value of F-statistic is less than 
0.05 then we can reject the null hypothesis (β1=β2=β3=β4=0) and accept the alternative 
one (β1≠β2≠β3≠β4≠0). This means that the independent variables jointly can influence the 
depended variable (BHAR). Since the p-value is less than 0.05 (more specifically equal to 
zero) we reject the null hypothesis and we conclude that there is at least one coefficient 
which is significantly different from zero. 
     Last but not least summary statistic is analyzed is the Durbin-Watson. Durbin-Watson 
is used to test if the residual series from an estimated model are autocorrelated. A 
Durbin-Watson close to 2.0 is consistent with no serial correlation, while a value close to 
0 means that probably there is serial correlation. As we can see from the output 
regression above, the Durbin-Watson is approximately 1.84, a quite satisfied value that 
confirms the absence of correlation.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Chris Brooks (2008), Introductory Econometrics for Finance, second edition, Cambridge, pg 
106 
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Table 9: Estimation output for second 6-month period 
Variable  Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic p-value 
      
Constant  -0.482567 0.121428 -3.974115 0.0001 
Issue Size  0.165447 0.030591 5.408361 0.0000 
Leverage  0.019191 0.015906 1.206564 0.2301 
Company Size  -0.000117 3.38E-05 -3.452066 0.0008 
Time Lag  -0.007892 0.010150 -0.777523 0.4385 
 
Regression Diagnostic Statistics 
 
R-squared 0.262429  Mean dependent var 0.099112 
Adjusted R-squared 0.236321  S.D. dependent var 0.457094 
S.E. of regression 0.399448  Akaike info Criterion 1.043985 
Sum squared resid 18.03017  Schwarz criterion 1.161387 
Log likelihood -56.59510  Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.091653 
F-statistic 10.05142  Durbin-Watson stat. 1.638407 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001   
 
 
 
     The table above represents the results for the second regression corresponding the 
second semi-annual period.  As we can see only three variables appear to be significant, 
the Constant variable with a p-value of 0.0001, the Issue Size with a p-value of 0.0000 and 
the Company Size with a p-value of 0.0008. This means that these particular independent 
variables are considered significant to influence the BHAR. The constant can be 
interpreted as follows: if all the independent variables are simultaneously equal to zero 
then BHARs are equal to -0.482567. As concerns the Issue Size variable, we could say 
that on each one percent increase of BHAR, there would be an impact on 0.165447 
percent increase of total share, provided that all the other variables remain constant.  
While for the next coefficient, Company Size we could say that on each one percent 
increase of BHAR, there would be an impact on 0.000117 decrease of current market 
capital percentage, with the assumption that all the other variables remain constant. As 
regards the correlation in this model the value of R2 (0.262429) indicates that the model 
pretty well fits the data. This means that 26.25% variation in BHAR (depended variable) 
can be explained jointly by the four independent variables. The rest 73.75% variation in 
BHAR can be expressed by residuals or other variables (other than Issue Size, Leverage, 
Company Size and Time Lag). In addition, for testing the joint significance of all the 
independent variables included in the model the value of F-statistic is evaluated. Since 
the p-value is less than 0.05 (specifically equal to zero) we reject the null hypothesis 
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(β1=β2=β3=β4=0) and we conclude that there is at least one coefficient which is 
significantly different from zero. Finally as we can see from the output regression above, 
the Durbin-Watson is approximately 1.64, a quite satisfied value that confirms the 
absence of correlation. 
 
Table 10: Estimation output for third 6-month period 
Variable  Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic p-value 
      
Constant  -0.338304 0.117127 -2.888349 0.0044 
Issue Size  0.147681 0.030624 4.822329 0.0000 
Leverage  0.008005 0.008771 0.912587 0.3629 
Company Size  -8.71E-05 2.77E-05 -3.147579 0.0020 
Time Lag  -0.002608 0.009869 -0.264210 0.7920 
 
Regression Diagnostic Statistics 
 
R-squared 0.158718  Mean dependent var 0.190059 
Adjusted R-squared 0.136432  S.D. dependent var 0.423626 
S.E. of regression 0.393668  Akaike info Criterion 1.004911 
Sum squared resid 23.40121  Schwarz criterion 1.102663 
Log likelihood -73.38308  Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.044614 
F-statistic 7.121995  Durbin-Watson stat. 1.717996 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000028   
 
 
 
     Examining the third period we can see again only three variables appear to be 
significant, the Constant variable with a p-value of 0.0044, the Issue Size with a p-value of 
0.0000 and the Company Size with a p-value of 0.0020. This means that these particular 
independent variables are considered significant to influence the BHAR. The constant 
can be interpreted as follows: if all the independent variables are simultaneously equal to 
zero then BHARs are equal to -0.338304. As concerns the Issue Size variable, we could 
say that on each one percent increase of BHAR, there would be an impact on 0.147681 
percent increase of total share, provided that all the other variables remain constant.  
While for the next coefficient, Company Size we could say that on each one percent 
increase of BHAR, there would be an impact on 0.000008 decrease of current market 
capital percentage, with the assumption that all the other variables remain constant. As 
regards the correlation in this model the value of R2 (0.158718) indicates that the model 
does not fit the data as well as in the previous case. In addition, for testing the joint 
significance of all the independent variables included in the model the value of F-statistic 
is evaluated. Since the p-value is less than 0.05 (specifically equal to zero) we reject the 
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null hypothesis (β1=β2=β3=β4=0) and we conclude that there is at least one coefficient 
which is significantly different from zero. Finally as we can see from the output 
regression above, the Durbin-Watson is approximately 1.64, a quite satisfied value that  
confirms the absence of correlation. 
 
 
Table 11: Estimation output for fourth 6-month period 
Variable  Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic p-value 
      
Constant  -0.416239 0.106809 -3.897047 0.0001 
Issue Size  0.180510 0.028690 6.291742 0.0000 
Leverage  0.004881 0.005816 0.839270 0.4024 
Company Size  -0.000117 3.05E-05 -3.826668 0.0002 
Time Lag  -0.003853 0.009278 -0.415274 0.6784 
 
Regression Diagnostic Statistics 
 
R-squared 0.201582  Mean dependent var 0.226677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.184225  S.D. dependent var 0.427966 
S.E. of regression 0.386540  Akaike info Criterion 0.962936 
Sum squared resid 27.49202  Schwarz criterion 1.048696 
Log likelihood -85.99743  Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.997679 
F-statistic 11.61394  Durbin-Watson stat. 1.764106 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
 
 
 
     Among the independent variables used for the fourth regression only the Constant, 
the Issue Size and the Company Size appear to be statistically significant even at the 0.05 
significance level, while all the remaining variables are statistically insignificant. 
Additionally, as it can be inferred by the value of the R2, which is 0.201582, the included 
into the model independent variables explain almost the 1/4 of the dependent’s 
variability. The value of the F-statistic for testing the joint significance of all the 
independent variables included in the model is pretty high (11.61) with the associated  p-
value to be equal to zero. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis (β1=β2=β3=β4=0) and 
we can conclude that there is at least one coefficient which is significantly different from 
zero. At last the Durbin-Watson is approximately 1.76, a high value that eliminates the 
evidence of correlation. 
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Table 12: Estimation output for fifth 6-month period 
Variable  Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic p-value 
      
Constant  0.465442 0.119533 3.893824 0.0001 
Issue Size  -0.061080 0.034090 -1.791694 0.0748 
Leverage  0.006571 0.010227 0.642488 0.5214 
Company Size  2.41E-05 3.12E-05 0.771943 0.4411 
Time Lag  0.004712 0.009840 0.478863 0.6326 
 
Regression Diagnostic Statistics 
 
R-squared 0.020153  Mean dependent var 0.277121 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001382  S.D. dependent var 0.400592 
S.E. of regression 0.400868  Akaike info Criterion 1.036007 
Sum squared resid 29.24659  Schwarz criterion 1.122401 
Log likelihood -91.86668  Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.071014 
F-statistic 0.935844  Durbin-Watson stat. 1.955325 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.444404   
 
 
     In the fifth regression model the results comparing to the previous outputs are 
changing. Among the independent variables used for the regression only the Constant 
appears to be statistically significant, while all the remaining variables are statistically 
insignificant since their p-values are less than 0.05. Additionally, as it can be inferred by 
the value of the R2, which is 0.020153, the included into the model independent variables 
do not explain the dependent’s variability pretty well. The value of the F-statistic for 
testing the joint significance of all the independent variables included in the model is 
pretty low (0.93) with the associated p-value to be equal to 0.444. Therefore, we accept 
the null hypothesis (β1=β2=β3=β4=0), meaning that all the independent variables cannot 
jointly explain or influence the BHAR. On the other hand Durbin-Watson statistic is on 
a significant high level, revealing the absence of correlation. 
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Table 13: Estimation output for sixth 6-month period 
Variable  Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic p-value 
      
Constant  -0.577412 0.122176 -4.726062 0.0000 
Issue Size  0.240117 0.031926 7.521054 0.0000 
Leverage  -0.007602 0.006853 -1.109297 0.2688 
Company Size  -0.000116 4.01E-05 -2.897343 0.0042 
Time Lag  -0.010659 0.011138 -0.956994 0.3398 
 
Regression Diagnostic Statistics 
 
R-squared 0.247712  Mean dependent var 0.263079 
Adjusted R-squared 0.231269  S.D. dependent var 0.522686 
S.E. of regression 0.458278  Akaike info Criterion 1.303552 
Sum squared resid 38.43335  Schwarz criterion 1.389628 
Log likelihood -117.5339  Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.338427 
F-statistic 15.06448  Durbin-Watson stat. 2.046381 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
 
 
     Among the independent variables used for the fourth regression only the Constant 
and the Issue Size appear to be statistically significant, while all the remaining variables 
are statistically insignificant. Additionally, as it can be inferred by the value of the R2, 
which is 0.247712, the included into the model independent variables explain almost the 
1/4 of the dependent’s variability. The value of the F-statistic for testing the joint 
significance of all the independent variables included in the model is pretty high (15.06) 
with the associated p-value to be equal to zero. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis 
(β1=β2=β3=β4=0) and we can conclude that there is at least one coefficient which is 
significantly different from zero. Finally the Durbin-Watson is approximately 2, a quite 
high value that eliminates the evidence of correlation. 
     Continuing, when the ordinary least squared estimation method is used it would be 
wiser to test if the explanatory variables are correlated with one another. The situation 
when the explanatory variables are very high correlated with each other is known as 
multicollinearity. The problem arises from multicollinearity is that inflates the standard 
errors, so it is difficult to assess the significance of the regressors used in our model. 
High value for the correlation coefficient is considered a value above 0.8. In order to test 
whether or not there is an evidence of multicollinearity six different correlation matrixes 
have been prepared in E-views. The following table is quoted below, represents an 
example for the first correlation matrix for the first period of the study.  
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Table 14: Correlation Matrix for the first 6-month period 
      
           
Regressors Bhar Issue Size Leverage Company Size Time Lag 
Bhar 1.000000     
      
Leverage  -0.001294 1.000000    
      
Company Size  -0.090912 -0.177754 1.000000   
      
Time Lag  -0.048741 6.31E-05 -0.076477 1.000000  
      
Issue Size  0.370395 -0.103397 0.662311 -0.047371 1.000000 
      
 
 
     As we can easily understand there is no evidence of multicolinnearity for that 
particular set of regressors since all the correlation coefficients are well below the 
threshold value of 0.8. The remaining correlation coefficients from the other periods of 
time (quoted in appendix) also resulted in the absence of multicolinnearity.  
8. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation study adds unique evidence to the international literature by examining 
the performance of IPOs in three European countries simultaneously and scrutinizing 
the factors that might affect their performance after listing. Specifically, using a sample of 
485 IPOs launched on various stock exchanges between 2006 and 2009, this study 
documents pretty high mean BHARs. The BHARs are examined for three years after 
their listing in a semiannual term. The results of the study reveal that IPOs in Germany, 
UK and France continue to overperform the market in the 6, 12, 18, 24 and 36 months’ 
holding period following their listing. On average, the IPOs overperform their market 
benchmark by 8.86%, 12.52%, 20.54%, 25.36%, 27.76% and 25.89% after one, two, 
three, four, five and six semesters of listing respectively. Furthermore, long-run returns 
are estimated for each country individually, concluding to the same results with the 
former case; continuously increase of BHARs until the first semester of the third year 
after listing.  
      Later on, a multivariable regression is performed in order to check which factors 
influence firms’ abnormal returns. The BHARs are used as independent variables, while 
the dependent variables are the following: 1) company size, 2) issue size, 3) leverage and 
finally 4) time lag. The results show that only two variables influence the long-run returns 
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which are the number of shares issued (issue size) and the current market capital 
(company size). Moreover there is a positive relationship between the issue size factor 
and the long-run performance of IPOs and then between the leverage and the long-term 
performance after listing. On the other hand the regression results reveal that there is a 
negative relationship between the company size and the long-run performance of IPOs 
and also between the time lag and the long-run performance of firms after listing. 
      The aim of this study is to provide investors with the necessary knowledge to make 
informed decisions regarding the choice of potential investment opportunities. The 
previous findings and the new empirical results are quoted in this dissertation study, 
could be guidance for the companies who intend to go public for first time. It is 
important for investors to understand that making an IPO does not always lead to high 
positive abnormal returns. Ever though some companies earn high returns in the early 
aftermarket period, there is always the possibility of underperformance after two or three 
years.  
     Potential future researchers could investigate IPOs in greater extent by using larger 
sample sources or a longer time horizon. The sample could include more European 
countries or could be divided into subgroups based on the Stock Exchange or the sector 
they participate. As concerns the time horizon, a time extension would be interesting 
since the current study reveals evidence of BHAR diminishing after two years. Hence, in 
order to have a more thorough and definite point of view a 5-year period could be an 
appropriate one.   
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Appendix 
Company Name Ticker from Bloomberg Location 
Groupe CLAF SA MLCLA FP Equity France 
Gartmore Group Ltd GRT LN Equity United Kingdom 
CFAO CFAO FP Equity France 
Magillem Design Services SA MLMGL FP Equity France 
Reworld SA MLREW FP Equity France 
Poiray Joaillier SA MLPOI FP Equity France 
M Winkworth Plc WINK LN Equity United Kingdom 
Flex LNG Ltd FLNG EU Equity United Kingdom 
Impax Asian Environmental IAEM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Weya SA MLWEY FP Equity France 
Vtion Wireless Technology AG V33 GR Equity Germany 
Indian Energy Ltd IEL LN Equity United Kingdom 
MPH Mittelstaendische Pharma 93MV GR Equity Germany 
NewRiver Retail Ltd NRR LN Equity United Kingdom 
BioQuanta SA MLBQA FP Equity France 
Plant Advanced Technologies MLPAT FP Equity France 
Quantum Genomics SAS MLQGC FP Equity France 
Ipernity Org SA MLIPY FP Equity France 
Crosslog SA MLCRO FP Equity France 
Debflex SA MLDEX FP Equity France 
Orkideus SA MLORK FP Equity France 
Sapmer SA ALMER FP Equity France 
Vanexport SA MLVAN FP Equity France 
Arthur Maury SA MLAMY FP Equity France 
Flatex AG FLA GR Equity Germany 
Groupe Rivalis SA MLRIV FP Equity France 
New Look Group PLC 648227Q LN Equity United Kingdom 
NewRiver Retail Ltd NRR LN Equity United Kingdom 
Solabios SA ALSOA FP Equity France 
Cecurity.com SA MLCEC FP Equity France 
Woogroup SA MLWOO FP Equity France 
TXCOM SA ALTXC FP Equity France 
Trans Consult Inter-tio-l SA MLTCO FP Equity France 
Infosat SA MLSAT FP Equity France 
Fonciere SEPRIC SA SPRIC FP Equity France 
Ecolutions GmbH & Co KGaA EO2 GR Equity Germany 
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Citibase Holdings PLC 3118981Z LN Equity United Kingdom 
Acropolis Telecom SA ALACR FP Equity France 
JSA Technology SA MLJSA FP Equity France 
Social Media Group SA MLSMG FP Equity France 
Motocab SA MLCAB FP Equity France 
Smalto SA MLSML FP Equity France 
MTD Fi-nce SA MLMTD FP Equity France 
Onemedia France SARL MLOMF FP Equity France 
Sunkar Resources PLC SKR LN Equity United Kingdom 
SMA Solar Technology AG S92 GR Equity Germany 
The Mighty Troglodytes 3619222Q FP Equity France 
Cadogan Petroleum PLC CAD LN Equity United Kingdom 
The ReThink Group PLC RTG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ipsogen SA ALIPS FP Equity France 
Toutabo SA MLABO FP Equity France 
Facilasol Group MLFAC FP Equity France 
GK Software AG GKS GR Equity Germany 
Iofina PLC IOF LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ropal Europe AG RO5K GR Equity Germany 
Orege SA MLORE FP Equity France 
Obtala Resources PLC OBT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Share PLC SHRE LN Equity United Kingdom 
Longships PLC LONG LN Equity United Kingdom 
OptinaTime SA MLOTI FP Equity France 
RocTool SA MLROC FP Equity France 
Valiant Petroleum PLC VPP LN Equity United Kingdom 
MGIC PLC MGIC LN Equity United Kingdom 
TP70 2008 (I) VCT TPV1 LN Equity United Kingdom 
TP70 2008 (II) VCT TPV2 LN Equity United Kingdom 
Kertel SA MLKER FP Equity France 
Car Telematics SA MLCTL FP Equity France 
designcapital PLC DESC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Randall & Quilter Invest Hldgs RQIH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Evolve Capital PLC EVOL LN Equity United Kingdom 
SmartQuantum Group MLSMA FP Equity France 
Hybrigenics SA ALHYG FP Equity France 
Fonterelli GmbH & Co KGaA FTR GR Equity Germany 
Ely Capital PLC ELYP PZ Equity United Kingdom 
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Flarepilot PLC FLAP PZ Equity United Kingdom 
SnackTime PLC SNAK LN Equity United Kingdom 
Globo PLC GBO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Baqus Group PLC BQS LN Equity United Kingdom 
BlueWater Bio Intl Ltd BWB LN Equity United Kingdom 
Eurasian natural Resources ENRC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ashmore Global Opportunities AGOL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Adili PLC ADIL LN Equity United Kingdom 
PurVia AG 3PV GR Equity Germany 
Plastics Capital PLC PLA LN Equity United Kingdom 
Mindscape France ALMIN FP Equity France 
Daldrup & Sohne AG 4DS GR Equity Germany 
e-Therapeutics Ltd ETX LN Equity United Kingdom 
manroland AG 2643758Q GR Equity Germany 
Tracsis PLC TRCS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Asian Bamboo AG 5AB GR Equity Germany 
MeVis Medical Solutions AG M3V GR Equity Germany 
EAVS MLEAV FP Equity France 
KTG Agrar AG 7KT GR Equity Germany 
Xcite Energy Ltd XEL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Abbey Protection PLC ABB LN Equity United Kingdom 
FranconoWest AG 4FR GR Equity Germany 
HCI Hammonia Shipping AG HHX GR Equity Germany 
Boomerang Plus PLC BOOM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Global Oil & Gas AG 3GO GR Equity Germany 
Bike Expand MLBIK FP Equity France 
i2s SA ALI2S FP Equity France 
Telecity Group PLC TCY LN Equity United Kingdom 
Surikate Mittelstands AG SAS GR Equity Germany 
Bureau Veritas SA BVI FP Equity France 
Groupe Plus-Values MLPVG FP Equity France 
Red Leopard Holdings PLC RLH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Centrotherm Photovoltaics AG CTN GR Equity Germany 
Eco City Vehicles PLC ECV LN Equity United Kingdom 
Voxan SA MLVOX FP Equity France 
Mobotix AG MBQ GR Equity Germany 
Chamarre SCA CHANV FP Equity France 
London Mining PLC LOND LN Equity United Kingdom 
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Astellia ALAST FP Equity France 
Arion Entreprise SA MLARI FP Equity France 
Metalliance MLETA FP Equity France 
Unika Groupe MLUKA FP Equity France 
All Leisure Group PLC ALLG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Delignit AG DLX GR Equity Germany 
Cargofresh AG C1F GR Equity Germany 
Envio AG EIO GR Equity Germany 
Kurawood PLC KURA LN Equity United Kingdom 
Craneware Plc CRW LN Equity United Kingdom 
TRSB SAS MLTRS FP Equity France 
Cards Off SA MLOFF FP Equity France 
Real Office Group PLC REAL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Hampden Underwriting PLC HUW LN Equity United Kingdom 
Carrefour SA-Real Estate CA FP Equity France 
Trailor ACTM Inter-tio-l SA MLTAI FP Equity France 
Kiwara PLC KIW LN Equity United Kingdom 
GoAdv SA ALGOA FP Equity France 
Sepura SEPU LN Equity United Kingdom 
Televista SA MLVST FP Equity France 
Hollywood Media Services PLC HOL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Orolia SA ALORO FP Equity France 
SNR SNR LN Equity United Kingdom 
SAF-HOLLAND GmbH SFQ GR Equity Germany 
Moneysupermarket.com MONY LN Equity United Kingdom 
GlobeOp Financial Services SA GO/ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Happydoo MLHAP FP Equity France 
Acheter-Louer.fr SA ALALO FP Equity France 
I-Design Group PLC IDG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Tawa PLC TAW LN Equity United Kingdom 
Smith & Williamson Group SWNGGRF LN Equity United Kingdom 
m4e AG MU4 GR Equity Germany 
Shieldtech PLC STEC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Norcros PLC NXR LN Equity United Kingdom 
CapRegen PLC CGN LN Equity United Kingdom 
Freshwater UK PLC FWUK LN Equity United Kingdom 
Groupimo ALIMO FP Equity France 
Homag Group AG HG1 GR Equity Germany 
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Arkoon Network Security SA ALARK FP Equity France 
EnviTec Biogas AG ETG GR Equity Germany 
Superglass Holdings PLC SPGH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Cervin ENR SA MLCVN FP Equity France 
Solia SA MLSOL FP Equity France 
Bionersis SA ALBRS FP Equity France 
Mount Engineering PLC MOU LN Equity United Kingdom 
EuropaCorp SA ECP FP Equity France 
Zeta Biotech MLZTA FP Equity France 
ZhongDe Waste Technology AG ZEF GR Equity Germany 
Cobra Holdings PLC CBRA LN Equity United Kingdom 
OFI Private Equity Capital SA 2728917Q FP Equity France 
m-u-t AG M7U GR Equity Germany 
SDI Group PLC SDIG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Tognum AG TGM GR Equity Germany 
Vivalis SA VLS FP Equity France 
Monitise PLC MONI LN Equity United Kingdom 
Fountaine Pajot SA ALFPC FP Equity France 
VTG AG VT9 GR Equity Germany 
STEICO AG ST5 GR Equity Germany 
AGO AG Energie + Anlagen AGY GR Equity Germany 
Westminster Group PLC WSG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Medicsight Plc MDST LN Equity United Kingdom 
Argan SA ARG FP Equity France 
Saltus European Debt SED LN Equity United Kingdom 
Vicorp Group PLC VICP LN Equity United Kingdom 
Fi-xo Environnement SA MLFXO FP Equity France 
GlobeOp Fi-ncial Services GO/ LN Equity United Kingdom 
InVision Software AG IVX GR Equity Germany 
Gerresheimer AG GXI GR Equity Germany 
Homair Vacances SA ALHOM FP Equity France 
Modern Water Plc MWG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Vergnet SA ALVER FP Equity France 
PV Crystalox Solar PLC PVCS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Pressure Technologies PLC PRES LN Equity United Kingdom 
IC Telecom SA ALICT FP Equity France 
Demos SA ALDMO FP Equity France 
Eaga PLC EAGA LN Equity United Kingdom 
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MarineTrack Ltd AAZ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Caneo SA MLCAN FP Equity France 
DF Deutsche Forfait AG DE6 GR Equity Germany 
blinkx PLC BLNX LN Equity United Kingdom 
Boetzelen Real Estate AG 0296987D GR Equity Germany 
JP Morgan Progressive JPSZ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Hargreaves Lansdown Plc HL/ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Batla Minerals MLBAT FP Equity France 
Hilton Food Group PLC HFG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Halloren Schokoladenfabrik AG H2R GR Equity Germany 
Rugby Estates Invest Trust PLC RUGB LN Equity United Kingdom 
genOway ALGEN FP Equity France 
CompuGroup Medical AG COP GR Equity Germany 
Roxi Petroleum PLC RXP LN Equity United Kingdom 
DL Software SA ALSDL FP Equity France 
Cineworld Group PLC CINE LN Equity United Kingdom 
Versatel AG VTW GR Equity Germany 
Bglobal PLC BGBL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Xchanging PLC XCH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Wellstream Holdings PLC WSM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Adthink Media ALADM FP Equity France 
Cheops Technology MLCHE FP Equity France 
Volga Gas PLC VGAS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ingenious Live VCT 2 PLC IEVC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ingenious Live VCT 1 ILV1 LN Equity United Kingdom 
ORA Capital Partners Plc ORA LN Equity United Kingdom 
AFC Energy PLC AFC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Local Shopping REIT PLC LSR LN Equity United Kingdom 
SMT Scharf AG S4A GR Equity Germany 
eXpansys PLC XPS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Edge Performance VCT PLC EDGE LN Equity United Kingdom 
METabolic EXplorer SA METEX FP Equity France 
Rexel SA RXL FP Equity France 
EpiStem Holdings PLC EHP LN Equity United Kingdom 
Eurogerm SA ALGEM FP Equity France 
Alstria Office AG AOX GR Equity Germany 
FLAG Telecom Group Ltd FTL LI Equity United Kingdom 
Estavis AG E7S GR Equity Germany 
46 
 
Brossard SA ALBRO FP Equity France 
Inland PLC INL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Avanti Communications AVN LN Equity United Kingdom 
VITA 34 Inter-tio-l AG V3V GR Equity Germany 
Braveheart Invest Grp Ltd BRH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Holosfind SA ALHOL FP Equity France 
Incity Immobilien AG IC8 GR Equity Germany 
Gottex Market Neutral Trust GMNT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Adenclassifieds SA ADEN FP Equity France 
Twintec AG TIN GR Equity Germany 
Polis Immobilien AG PQL GR Equity Germany 
Varengold AG VG8 GR Equity Germany 
Vectron Systems AG V3S GR Equity Germany 
Trust Property Ma-gement PLC TPM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Nighthawk Energy PLC HAWK LN Equity United Kingdom 
Safestore Holdings PLC SAFE LN Equity United Kingdom 
Notrefamille.com SA ALNFA FP Equity France 
HanseYachts AG H9Y GR Equity Germany 
BH Macro BHMG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Kromi Logistik AG K1R GR Equity Germany 
IPSO Ventures PLC IPS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Equable Properties PLC EQU LN Equity United Kingdom 
Leni Gas & Oil LGO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Neuropharm Group PLC NPH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Sports Direct Intl PLC SPD LN Equity United Kingdom 
Cie Fonciere Fideimur SA CFI FP Equity France 
Hexagon Human Capital PLC HHC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Mon Plus Beau Jour MLPBJ FP Equity France 
Broca Plc BROC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Gem Diamonds Ltd GEMD LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ariston Real Estate Ag A3E GR Equity Germany 
Cellectis SA ALCLS FP Equity France 
Entreparticuliers.com ALENT FP Equity France 
Diamondcorp Plc DCP LN Equity United Kingdom 
Helius Energy Plc HEGY LN Equity United Kingdom 
Auto Escape SA ALAUT FP Equity France 
Dev Property Development PLC DPD LN Equity United Kingdom 
Novalia Francgines MLNOF FP Equity France 
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Dietswell Engineering SA ALDIE FP Equity France 
VDI Group SA ALVDI FP Equity France 
Ashley House PLC ASH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Optimark SA MLOPM FP Equity France 
Brightside Group PLC BRT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Timan Oil & Gas PLC TMAN LN Equity United Kingdom 
Transiciel TRA FP Equity France 
Vertu Motors PLC VTU LN Equity United Kingdom 
Genfit SA ALGFT FP Equity France 
All Points North PLC APNO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Northern Bear PLC NTBR LN Equity United Kingdom 
Terreis SA TER FP Equity France 
eFront SA ALEFT FP Equity France 
CQS Rig Fi-nce Fund RIG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Auplata SA ALAUP FP Equity France 
JPMorgan Income & Growth inves JIGC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Imagi-tik PLC IMTK LN Equity United Kingdom 
Taihua PLC TAIH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Renewable Power & Light PLC RPL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Sabien Technology Group PLC SNT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Symrise AG SY1 GR Equity Germany 
Consolidated Vending PLC CVD LN Equity United Kingdom 
Turenne Investissement SA ALTUR FP Equity France 
Brainjuicer Group PLC BJU LN Equity United Kingdom 
SeLoger.com SA SLG FP Equity France 
SKW SKW GR Equity Germany 
Salamander Energy PLC SMDR LN Equity United Kingdom 
Groupe Promeo SA ALMEO FP Equity France 
Francotyp-Postalia AG & Co KG FPH GR Equity Germany 
Southern Bear PLC CVN LN Equity United Kingdom 
EDF Energies Nouvelles SA EEN FP Equity France 
Klemurs SCA KMU FP Equity France 
Hitechpros SA ALHIT FP Equity France 
Just Retirement(Holdings)PLC JR/ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Golden Prospect Precious Metal GPM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Japaninvest Group PLC 2003151Z LN Equity United Kingdom 
SiC Processing AG 2998610Q GR Equity Germany 
Trilogiq ALTRI FP Equity France 
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Korian KORI FP Equity France 
nabaltec AG NTG GR Equity Germany 
BlueBay Asset Ma-gement PLC BBAY LN Equity United Kingdom 
Nouveaux Constructeurs SA LNC FP Equity France 
LSL Property Services PLC LSL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Money Debt & Credit Group PLC MDCG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Wilex AG WL6 GR Equity Germany 
PETROTEC AG PT8 GR Equity Germany 
Hochschild Mining PLC HOC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ab Fenetres Grp ALABF FP Equity France 
MedicX Fund Ltd MXF LN Equity United Kingdom 
Styles & Wood Group PLC STY LN Equity United Kingdom 
Betbrokers PLC BETB LN Equity United Kingdom 
In-te Pharma SA IPH FP Equity France 
Proton Power Systems PLC P6K GR Equity Germany 
Thomas Fleurs SA MLTFL FP Equity France 
ECT Industries SA ALNSE FP Equity France 
Muehlhan AG M4N GR Equity Germany 
Neuf Cegetel SA NEUF FP Equity France 
CWI Real Estate AG CW6 GR Equity Germany 
LHS AG LHS GR Equity Germany 
hotel.de AG HTL GR Equity Germany 
GAGFAH Immobilien Ma-gement GFJ GR Equity Germany 
Dunelm Group PLC DNLM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Nanogate AG N7G GR Equity Germany 
Assima PLC 0361337D LN Equity United Kingdom 
Lee Diversified Opportunities 813845Z LN Equity United Kingdom 
Hurricane Fuels PLC 825781Z LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ashmore Investment Ma-gement 551746Z LN Equity United Kingdom 
Cazenove Absolute Equity Ltd CAEL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Biffa PLC BIFF LN Equity United Kingdom 
Hogg Robinson Group PLC HRG LN Equity United Kingdom 
GWB Immobilien AG G7B GR Equity Germany 
Selectirente Fonciere d'Invest SELER FP Equity France 
SSP Holdings PLC SSPH LN Equity United Kingdom 
debitel AG DBL GR Equity Germany 
Hydrogen Group PLC HYDG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Mousset & Cie MLMOU FP Equity France 
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Network Data Holdings PLC NDH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Invista Real Estate Investment INRE LN Equity United Kingdom 
Xiring SA ALXIR FP Equity France 
Biocare Solutions PLC BSN LN Equity United Kingdom 
FranconoRheinMain AG F7R GR Equity Germany 
Chromex Mining PLC CHX LN Equity United Kingdom 
Aquabella Group PLC AQA LN Equity United Kingdom 
Probability PLC PBTY LN Equity United Kingdom 
Aurelian Oil & Gas PLC AUL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Velosi Ltd VELO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Energetix Group EGX LN Equity United Kingdom 
Best of the Best Plc BEST LN Equity United Kingdom 
Qimonda AG QI1A GR Equity Germany 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG BBINS30 GR Equity Germany 
CareCapital Group PLC CARE LN Equity United Kingdom 
1PM PLC OPM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Heritage Underwriting Agency HUA LN Equity United Kingdom 
Imperial Innovations Group PLC IVO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Tesfran SA TEF FP Equity France 
ITN -novation AG I7N GR Equity Germany 
Goldplat PLC GDP LN Equity United Kingdom 
Proservia SA ALPRV FP Equity France 
Heritage Uderwriting Agency UML LN Equity United Kingdom 
Silverdell PLC SID LN Equity United Kingdom 
aleo solar AG AS1 GR Equity Germany 
Arden Partners PLC ARDN LN Equity United Kingdom 
Piscines Groupe GA ALPGG FP Equity France 
Target Resources PLC TGT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Voyageurs du Monde SA ALVDM FP Equity France 
NetBooster SA ALNBT FP Equity France 
Futura Medical PLC FUM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Standard Life PLC SL/ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Southern Cross Healthcare SCHE LN Equity United Kingdom 
Biofrontera AG B8F GR Equity Germany 
nationwide Accident Repair NARS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Tasty PLC TAST LN Equity United Kingdom 
ProwebCE SA ALPRW FP Equity France 
Bauer AG B5A GR Equity Germany 
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Greatland Gold PLC GGP LN Equity United Kingdom 
African Consolidated Resources AFCR LN Equity United Kingdom 
LeGuide.com SA ALGUI FP Equity France 
Kloeckner & Co SE KCO GR Equity Germany 
Heurtey Petrochem SA ALHPC FP Equity France 
Parrot SA PARRO FP Equity France 
Puricore PURI LN Equity United Kingdom 
Heliocentris Fuel Cells AG H2FA GR Equity Germany 
Sound Oil PLC SOU LN Equity United Kingdom 
Medicrea SA ALMED FP Equity France 
Weborama ALWEB FP Equity France 
10tacle studios AG T1C GR Equity Germany 
Demag Cranes AG D9C GR Equity Germany 
May Gurney Integrated Services MAYG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Avid Holdings AVD LN Equity United Kingdom 
Aeroports de Paris SA ADP FP Equity France 
Dillistone Group Plc DSG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Cedip Infrared Systems ALCED FP Equity France 
Le Noble Age SA LNA FP Equity France 
Medica SA MDCA FP Equity France 
Corsie Group CEG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Inspired Gaming Group PLC INGG LN Equity United Kingdom 
YOC AG YOC GR Equity Germany 
PROACTIS Holdings PLC PHD LN Equity United Kingdom 
CELEOS SA ALCEL FP Equity France 
GENEART AG G6A GR Equity Germany 
St James's Energy Ltd STJ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Inova Holding Ltd INA LN Equity United Kingdom 
European Islamic Investment EIIB LN Equity United Kingdom 
Silverjet PLC SIL LN Equity United Kingdom 
Roth & Rau AG R8R GR Equity Germany 
Air Berlin PLC & Co AB1 GR Equity Germany 
Digital Identification D7S GR Equity Germany 
Acertec PLC ACER LN Equity United Kingdom 
Cineworld Group PLC CINE LN Equity United Kingdom 
Atelis Ltd ATEL LN Equity United Kingdom 
MBB Industries AG MBB GR Equity Germany 
H&T Group PLC HAT LN Equity United Kingdom 
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Turbotec Products TRBO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Mastrad SA ALMAS FP Equity France 
Biofutures Inter-tio-l PLC BIP LN Equity United Kingdom 
Debenhams PLC DEB LN Equity United Kingdom 
Bioganix PLC BGX LN Equity United Kingdom 
Baltic Oil Terminals PLC BTC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Dresdner Factoring AG D2F GR Equity Germany 
Oxford Catalysts Group PLC OCG LN Equity United Kingdom 
ReEnergy Group Plc RGY LN Equity United Kingdom 
Lansdowne Oil & Gas PLC LOGP LN Equity United Kingdom 
Horizonte Minerals PLC HZM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Rift Oil PLC RIFT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Lamarthe SA ALLMR FP Equity France 
Press Index SA ALPRI FP Equity France 
Mission Marketing Group PLC TMMG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Icade SA ICAD FP Equity France 
Wacker Chemie AG WCH GR Equity Germany 
Legrand SA LR FP Equity France 
ModeLabs Group SA MDL FP Equity France 
Renovo RNVO LN Equity United Kingdom 
MAGIX AG MGX GR Equity Germany 
Bio-Gate AG BIG GR Equity Germany 
Pantheon Resources PLC PANR LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ludorum PLC LUD LN Equity United Kingdom 
Melchior Japan Investment Tr MJT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Prodware SA ALPRO FP Equity France 
Patrizia Immobilien AG P1Z GR Equity Germany 
Optimus SA MLOPT FP Equity France 
CashBox PLC CBOX LN Equity United Kingdom 
Charlemagne Capital Limited CCAP LN Equity United Kingdom 
CeGeREAL SA CGR FP Equity France 
Amboise Investissement SCA LTA FP Equity France 
Northbridge Industrial Svcs NBI LN Equity United Kingdom 
Playtech Ltd PTEC LN Equity United Kingdom 
Millet Innovation SA ALINN FP Equity France 
Morson Group Ltd MRN LN Equity United Kingdom 
Fonciere Paris France SA FPF FP Equity France 
ecotel communication AG E4C GR Equity Germany 
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Venteco PLC VTO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Evolis SA ALTVO FP Equity France 
Zueblin Immobiliere France ZIF FP Equity France 
Kalahari Minerals PLC KAH LN Equity United Kingdom 
Servocell Group SERV LN Equity United Kingdom 
Kleenair Systems Intl PLC KSI LN Equity United Kingdom 
Invocas Group PLC INVO LN Equity United Kingdom 
Ovum PLC OVM LN Equity United Kingdom 
Rightmove.co.uk RMV LN Equity United Kingdom 
Cohort Plc CHRT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Scott Wilson Group PLC SWG LN Equity United Kingdom 
Betex Group PLC BTX LN Equity United Kingdom 
Arthro Kinetics PLC AKI LN Equity United Kingdom 
Clean Air Power Ltd CAP LN Equity United Kingdom 
Phynova Group PLC PYN LN Equity United Kingdom 
Work Group Plc WORK LN Equity United Kingdom 
Mobile Streams PLC MOS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Personal Screening PLC PSP LN Equity United Kingdom 
AdEPT Telecom PLC ADT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Cagney PLC CGNY LN Equity United Kingdom 
primion Technology AG P4T GR Equity Germany 
QinetiQ Group PLC QQ/ LN Equity United Kingdom 
Optos PLC OPTS LN Equity United Kingdom 
Email Vision ALEMV FP Equity France 
BP Marsh & Partners PLC BPM LN Equity United Kingdom 
1000Mercis SA ALMIL FP Equity France 
Store Electronic Systems SA SESL FP Equity France 
Chariot(UK)PLC CRT LN Equity United Kingdom 
Clasquin ALCLA FP Equity France 
Appian Technology PLC APN LN Equity United Kingdom 
Stratex Inter-tio-l PLC STI LN Equity United Kingdom 
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Table 15: Correlation Matrix for the second 6-month period 
      
           
Regressors Bhar Issue Size Leverage Company Size Time Lag 
Bhar 1.000000     
      
Issue Size  0.418834 1.000000    
      
Leverage  0.078899 -0.010911 1.000000   
      
Company Size  -0.228885 0.099764 0.041476 1.000000  
      
Time Lag  -0.088036 -0.104399 0.035933 -0.063445 1.000000 
      
 
 
Table 16: Correlation Matrix for the third 6-month period 
      
           
Regressors Bhar Issue Size Leverage Company Size Time Lag 
Bhar 1.000000     
      
Leverage  0.064708 1.000000    
      
Company Size  0.313822 -0.015789 1.000000   
      
Time Lag  -0.153584 -0.010313 0.237843 1.000000  
      
Issue Size  -0.033340 0.002760 -0.063660 -0.040790 1.000000 
      
 
 
Table 17: Correlation Matrix for the fourth 6-month period 
      
           
Regressors Bhar Issue Size Leverage Company Size Time Lag 
Bhar 1.000000     
      
Leverage  0.098445 1.000000    
      
Issue Size  0.365826 0.103447 1.000000   
      
Company Size  -0.133708 0.007718 0.295195 1.000000  
      
Time Lag  -0.039468 0.010662 -0.049496 -0.033902 1.000000 
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Table 18: Correlation Matrix for the fifth 6-month period 
      
           
Regressors Bhar Issue Size Leverage Company Size Time Lag 
Bhar 1.000000     
      
Issue Size   -0.117088 1.000000    
      
Leverage 0.034752 0.085646 1.000000   
      
Company Size  -0.002475 0.436470 -0.009425 1.000000  
      
Time Lag  0.041298 -0.047775 0.015482 -0.026033 1.000000 
      
 
 
Table 19: Correlation Matrix for the sixth 6-month period 
      
           
Regressors Bhar Issue Size Leverage Company Size Time Lag 
Bhar 1.000000     
      
Issue Size   0.452302 1.000000    
      
Leverage -0.054583 0.030396 1.000000   
      
Company Size  0.000780 0.380634 -0.000906 1.000000  
      
Time Lag  -0.109992 -0.105596 -0.007424 -0.032663 1.000000 
      
 
 
